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Introduction  
In Iran’s history, there have been two prominent periods where international interference 
has led to a marked decrease in state revenue. One of these periods was in 1953, when a Central 
Intelligence Agency coup allowed the Anglo-Iranian oil company to reclaim possession of 
Iranian oil. The second was in 2006 to 2015, when the international community imposed various 
sanctions on Iran in order to curb the country’s nuclear weapons program. Charles Tilly’s theory 
of state formation shows how the change in capital is tied to key events that changed the coercive 
capacity of the Iranian government.  
Literature Review  
Two prominent theories of state formation are found in Charles Tilly’s Coercion, Capital, 
and European States, AD 990-1990 (1990) and in Francis Fukuyama’s two volume work, The 
Origins of Political Order: From prehuman times to the French Revolution (2011) and Political 
Order and Political Decay: From the industrial revolution to the globalization of democracy 
(2014).  
Tilly’s argument is that states are characterized by their competition for territory and 
population (Tilly, 1990, 4). People need resources to function, and resources are finite (Tilly, 
1990). War is necessary for resource acquisition, and war costs money - in order to extract the 
necessary funds or means to wage war, rulers had to have the power to force subjects to 
surrender the needed funds or means (Tilly, 1990). Implementing coercive measures to tax 
capital creates governments – in order to collect taxes for bureaucracy to function, tax collectors 
must be in place to collect capital (Tilly, 1990). In order to acquire capital - the resources or 
enforceable claims on resources - a ruler must first implement coercion (Tilly, 1990). Coercion is 
“all concerted application, threatened or actual, of action that commonly causes loss or damage 
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to the persons or possessions of individuals or groups who are aware of both the action and the 
potential damage” (Tilly, 1990, 19). In other words, coercion is state capacity, employed for the 
purpose of perpetuating the state. Once a ruler has used coercion to obtain capital, then they may 
implement further coercion in the form of war. It is this tug of war “extraction and struggle over 
the means of war created the central organizational structures of states.” (Tilly, 1990, 28). For 
example, the need for state income created the need for taxes, and then for a bureau to manage 
those taxes, and an accounting department to calculate taxes… And thus, layer by layer, the state 
is formed. Over time, as the needs of the state change, institutions change and layers of 
government are added or pulled away.   
The unique character of each state is born out of the unique capital/coercion balance that 
was necessary in the history of that state, and such a balance is always dependent upon the 
relative relationship between two variables (Tilly, 1990). The various levels of capital and 
coercion required to run a state depend on many factors, including population, geography, 
culture, and resources. A state will attempt to find homeostasis (homeostatesis, if you will) 
between capital and coercion. The relative level of capital to coercion within an individual state 
is important to state formation. If coercion is too high and capital too low, then a regime could be 
characterized as authoritarian. If there is too little coercion and too little capital, a state could be 
characterized as a failed state. If there is high coercion and high capital, then a state could be 
characterized as socialist or communist. It is the relative level of capital to coercion within the 
state that is important, not the absolute levels of capital or coercion.  This explains the variation 
in states that were formed in European history (Tilly, 1990).  
 Francis Fukuyama establishes a different theoretical viewpoint. He claims that the 
capital/coercion balance caused by warmaking is insufficient to explain the large variety of states 
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around the globe (Fukuyama, 2011, 23). He points to other causal factors in state variation, such 
as technology, physical geography, population density, and religion (Fukuyama, 2011, 23).   
Fukuyama’s argument is that states are characterized by their institutions, and that a state 
is made as institutions are formed, as institutions are the fundamental building blocks of an 
effective and lasting government (Fukuyama, 2011). Institutions are rooted in human biological 
need for social interaction, and repeated interactions over time create norms, which are then 
formalized into institutions (Fukuyama, 2011). A good example is the family; the family unit of 
an older generation of caregivers and a younger generation of dependents is a creation of biology 
and dependence. An individual is viewed within the context of their family and their 
relationships to others – they are a child, sister, husband, etc. Over time, this is institutionalized 
through family names, for identification purposes.  These institutions of relationships permeate 
all levels of society.  
Such “Institutions, according to Huntington, are ‘stable, valued, recurring patterns of 
behavior’ whose most important function is to facilitate human collective action” (Fukuyama, 
2014, 462). Institutions contribute to political order, or the ideas that create political associations 
that shape ideas surrounding legitimacy and self-interest (Fukuyama, 2011, 16). Political order 
provides the strength and stability needed for a strong state. However, “The very stability of 
institutions is also the source of political decay. Institutions are created to meet the demands of 
specific circumstances. However, the original environment in which institutions are created is 
subject to change” (Fukuyama, 2014, 463). Political decay occurs when political systems fail to 
adjust to changing circumstances (Fukuyama, 2011, 7). A strong and effective state must have 
institutions that contribute to political order, while also providing mechanisms to correct for 
political decay.   
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The difference between Tilly’s theory and Fukuyama’s theory is an important one. Tilly 
believes resources form states. Fukuyama claims that people and their institutions form states. 
While people are a sufficient condition for states, people can only exist and perpetuate 
themselves in a specific place if they have enough resources. If there are not enough resources to 
support a population, the population will move or die off. As such, people are a sufficient 
condition for a state, but resources are a necessary condition for a state.  
While institutions are important factors in state formation, they are not exemptions to the 
capital/coercion balance. Variable factors that Fukuyama notes, such as population density, 
require an increased amount of capital to sustain and an increased amount of coercion to control. 
This choice between Tilly’s theory of capital and coercion, and Fukuyama’s theory of 
institutions, is a false dichotomy. Tilly’s theoretical framework of capital and coercion provides 
the foundation for Fukuyama’s theoretical framework regarding institutions. Institutions, instead 
of an alternative to capital and coercion, are the status quo maintenance of coercion and capital. 
Such institutions are the sticky structure that supports the existing capital/coercion balance. 
When the balance changes, the institutional needs change and political decay begins.  
The state balance between capital and coercion is always changing, as states form and 
reform themselves over time – the tension between political order and political decay is 
constantly shaping the state.  
When a state imposes sanctions, targeted or otherwise, they are inserting themselves into 
the capital and coercion balance, and thereby instigating political order or political decay. In 
order to implement effective sanctions, the imposing state must understand how its sanctions – 
inherently a decrease in capital - will change the capital/coercion balance and change the nature 
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of the target state. As such, an examination of the history of the target state is needed, in order to 
comprehend how the sanctions will further or change the target state’s narrative.  
Hypotheses  
 There are two hypotheses addressed in this paper, an overarching hypothesis and an Iran-
specific hypothesis.  
Overarching hypothesis: If sanctions are imposed, then the sanctioned country’s 
capital will decrease as the technology, suppliers, or export destinations are cut off.  
Iran-specific hypothesis: In Iran’s history, as imperialist countries have claimed 
oil rights or as sanctions against Iranian oil have been imposed, the coercive capabilities 
of the Iranian government have been increased.  
Sanctions Overview 
Sanctions are “punitive diplomatic, economic, and social actions taken by the 
international community against a state that has violated international law” (Brown, McLean & 
McMillan, 2018). Sanctions follow siege mentality (Allen, 2008). As the need for more 
resources inspires war-making, a lack of resources can force capitulation by making the political 
and humanitarian costs to the opposing party unbearable. In a siege, necessary resources are cut 
off, and the resulting human rights abuses that occur are used as leverage for the cessation of 
war. Sanctions work in much the same way – a resource or resources are cut off from a targeted 
population, in hopes that the absence of that resource will be so unbearable that the sanctioning 
state’s aims will be agreed to.  
 The siege mentality of sanctions also helps explain why targeted sanctions were 
developed.  Sanctions use the pain of lack of resources as leverage. It is this exact pain, applied 
to all members of the target population - not just the guilty ones - that make blanket sanctions 
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problematic (Neier, 2015: Pavel, & Pattison, 2015). Comprehensive sanctions increase 
repression, and democracy and human rights scores drop in target governments under 
comprehensive sanctions as the government passes the pain of sanctions down to its people 
(Drezner, 2011: Cameron, 2005). As such, targeted sanctions were developed to attempt to limit 
the restriction of resources to those who were partaking in the undesirable behavior, and their 
supporters (Portela, 2016). Examples of targeted sanctions are travel bans, asset freezes, and 
arms embargoes (Portela, 2016: Elliot 2005).   
 Sanctions can be imposed successfully only by states that have enough capital and 
coercion to fully implement the sanctions. The imposing state must have enough capital so that 
the loss of imports or exports with the target state will not cripple the sanctioning state. 
Additionally, the sanctioning state must have enough coercive capability to implement and 
enforce sanctions (Biersteker et. al., 2005). A siege on only half a city, or only on some days of 
the week is not a very successful siege. 
 Sanctions work under an assumption that the target state does not have indefinite capital 
or coercive capabilities – eventually, the government will lack the capital to provide for their 
people, or they will lose the coercive capabilities needed to keep order in their state. The current 
approach to sanctions involves depriving “the leadership of the benefits associated with 
presenting themselves as providers of public services and infrastructure projects vis-à-vis their 
citizenry” (Portela, 2016, 923). When this breakdown happens, the expectation is that the people 
will revolt and the government will collapse, or the government will be willing to negotiate. In 
this way, sanctions can also serve as a tool to encourage dialogue, in addition to being punitive 
(Allen, 2008). It is important to note that all capital and coercion is relative, and what works in 
one country will not work in another. This relativity influences the cost-benefit calculations of 
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the state, not their preferences, and it is the cost-benefit calculations that drive the state to act 
(Koch, 2015). It is crucial to understand the cost-benefit calculations the target state will 
undertake, before implementing sanctions.  
 An additional complication to sanctions imposition arises out of the nature of sanctions as 
an imposed punishment. The country sending sanctions is punishing the target state for behavior 
that the sender deems inappropriate, or to influence the target’s behavior in the way that the 
sender country desires (Molenaers et. al., 2014). As such, sanctions – targeted or otherwise – are 
always more about the politics, and prominent political and economic persons, of the sender 
country than the target country (Molenaers et. al., 2014: Elliot, 2005: Wallensteen, 2005). This 
also helps explain why targeted sanctions have increased in popularity – if the sender country 
seeks to encourage moral leadership amongst the international order, then the human rights 
violations of blanket sanctions are counterproductive and the legitimacy of the sender country is 
compromised (Gordon, 2015).  
 One of the unforeseen impacts of sanctions is how sanctions can strengthen the current 
regime instead of weaken it. There are two key reasons as to why. First, sanctions increase the 
need for revenue streams, and thereby strengthen the institutions created to bring in revenue. 
Tilly shows that states are formed as capital-collecting mechanisms, like tax collection, are 
created and maintained (Tilly, 1990). When sanctions decrease revenue streams, target 
governments will attempt to collect more capital by utilizing other forms of non-sanctioned 
production and trade (de Vries, Portela & Guijarro-Usobaiga, 2014: Escribá-Folch & Wright, 
2010: Allen, 2008). Additionally, “trade sanctions encourage the creation of organized crime 
syndicates and transnational smuggling networks” (Drezner, 2011, 98). One such example is 
Hezbollah; Hezbollah has historically received funds from the Iranian and Syrian governments, 
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but, “In the past few years, however, these partners have not been as generous. Iran is 
undergoing devastating economic sanctions and the Syrian state is caught up in a civil war. 
Hezbollah's criminal activities are designed to help plug that gap” (Levitt, 2013). When 
traditional financial conduits fail, organizations turn to nontraditional methods of revenue 
acquisition, such as cross-border activities like arms, drugs, and money trafficking (Levitt, 
2013). Such diversification or leaks allow the targeted regime – or associated criminal and 
terrorist organizations - to reinforce their presence in unexpected areas and cushion the impact of 
sanctions. This element of sanctions reinforces why sanctions enforcement is so crucial and so 
difficult – sanctions can only work as intended in a confined trade space.  
Secondly, as capital becomes scarce, the regime can cut down on non-governmental 
services. An example of non-governmental services being cut is the effect of sanctions on non-
governmental media. As capital is restricted, the government can cut grants and other funding to 
media sources that do not support the regime, reducing the capabilities and reach of the 
independent media and restricting free press (Peksen, 2010). When the government is the only 
source of media, it is easier to influence public opinion in support of the target regime, 
strengthening their influence. By turning the populace against the sending country, the target 
regime can strengthen itself at the sender’s expense (Wallensteen, 2005).   
The relative nature and the range of possibilities that sanctions encapsulate require a 
thorough understanding of the target country, if sanctions are to be successful.  
History of Iran through a Capital/Coercion Lens  
As oil revenue has been a significant contributor to government spending in Iran, the 
presence of capital and coercion have been inextricable for much of Iran’s recent history. In 
instances where the Iranian government has controlled the lion’s share of the oil revenue, the 
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Iranian government’s coercive capacity has been high. However, in instances where the Iranian 
government has controlled little of the oil revenue, the Iranian government’s coercive capacity 
has been low. Much of this variation in capital and coercion since 1951 has been due to foreign 
interference. Two key examples of the capital and coercion tug-of-war caused by access to oil as 
a key resource can be seen in 1951-53 with the oil nationalization and subsequent Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) coup, and the sanctions imposed against Iran from 2011 to the 
eventual JCPOA agreement. 
1951-1953 
Mossadeq1 and oil nationalization 
Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq was “appointed Iranian prime minister by 
Muhammad Reza Shah in 1951” (Esposito, 2003). In 1951, Prime Minister Mossadeq led a 
referendum that resulted in Iranian nationalization of the British-Iranian oil company, Anglo-
Iranian oil (Esposito, 2003). This was done despite the influence of Muhammad Reza Shah. The 
nationalization of the oil company theoretically created increased capital for the Iranian 
government, and was done in the name of increasing Iran’s resource rights (Talbot, 2015). The 
National Iranian Oil Company was created, and a smooth transfer of control was attempted 
(Abrahamian, 2008, 117). However, as retaliation for nationalization the British government 
halted their technical support, taking oil production to a standstill (O'Neil, Fields & Share, 2018, 
518). Mossadeq was able to outmaneuver the existing coercive systems to increase capital for the 
Iranian people.   
 																																																								
1 Abrahamian’s (2008) use of the spelling ‘Mossadeq’ is the spelling adopted throughout this analysis.  
2 There are various arguments about the success and impact of the CIA. Further reading:  
Abrahamian, E. (2008). A history of modern Iran. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University  
Press, p. 118-122. 
Gasiorowski, M. J. (2000). The CIA Looks Back at the 1953 Coup in Iran. Middle East Report, 216, 4-5. 
Takeyh, R. (2014, June 16). What Really Happened in Iran: The CIA, the Ouster of Mosaddeq, and the  
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CIA coup 
The loss of revenue from the defunded company angered the British government (Talbot, 
2015: Abrahamian, 2008: Takeyh, 2014). The change in capital flows, away from the United 
Kingdom and the US, triggered a response in the UK and US intelligence agencies (Esposito, 
2003: Abrahamian, 2008). In 1953, the CIA allocated $1 million to sponsor demonstrations and a 
political crisis to oust Mossadeq (Gasiorowski, 2000: Abrahamian, 2008: Talbot, 2015). This 
undertaking was known as Operation Ajax (O'Neil, Fields & Share, 2018, 519). Mossadeq was 
unable to outmaneuver the CIA - if he cut a deal with the British to return some of their oil 
shares, he would be seen as selling out his country to the West (Talbot, 2015, 232). Instead, the 
Iranian people were handed over to a puppet government chosen by the West. Mohammad Reza 
Shah was reinstalled by the CIA in 1953 (Talbot, 2015, 138). The CIA’s involvement2 handed 
control of Iranian oil back to the West.  
The change in regime increased the authoritarian nature of Iran’s government. Polity IV 
measures regime type; it “aggregates indicators of executive recruitment, executive 
independence, and political competition into a single numerical score. The positive end of the 
polity scale (+10) denotes a strongly democratic regime, while the negative end (-10) indicates a 
strongly autocratic regime,” (Kliman, 2015, 30). As shown in Chart 1.1, Iran’s authoritarian 
tendencies increased sharply in 1953, and remained high until the Iranian Revolution in 1979. 
																																																								
2 There are various arguments about the success and impact of the CIA. Further reading:  
Abrahamian, E. (2008). A history of modern Iran. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University  
Press, p. 118-122. 
Gasiorowski, M. J. (2000). The CIA Looks Back at the 1953 Coup in Iran. Middle East Report, 216, 4-5. 
Takeyh, R. (2014, June 16). What Really Happened in Iran: The CIA, the Ouster of Mosaddeq, and the  
Restoration of the Shah. Council on Foreign Relations.	
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Under the shah, the Anglo-
Iranian oil company was able to 
recoup much of their lost company 
and, in 1954, renamed themselves 
British Petroleum (BP. Post war - 
1946-1970). The official page for 
British Petroleum - now known as bp 
- summarizes the 1951-1954 
contention over oil as, 
Within 18 months, the Iranian economy was in ruins. Mobs in the streets demanded the 
prime minister’s resignation. When the parties returned to the table, they hashed out a 
new arrangement allowing a consortium of companies, including Standard Oil of Indiana 
(Amoco) and others, to run the oil operations in Iran. Anglo-Iranian’s stake was 40%. 
(BP. Post war - 1946-1970). 
 
The official bp narratives ignores the ways in which US government capital and coercive 
capabilities were used to overwhelm Iranian government capital and coercive capabilities, in 
favor of the oil companies. The CIA threw its weight behind the status quo flows of oil revenue 
and government functioning, and protected pre-existing institutions like bp.  
Westoxication 
Western interference, the loss of oil revenues, and the reinstallation of a Western-backed 
shah fueled anti-Western and anti-American sentiment in Iran, including what was termed 
‘Westoxication’. Westoxication was created by  
Jalal al-e Ahmad to describe the fascination with and dependence upon the West to the 
detriment of traditional, historical, and cultural ties to Islam and Islamic world. Defined 
as an indiscriminate borrowing from and imitation of the West, joining the twin dangers 
of cultural imperialism and political domination. Implies a sense of intoxication or 
infatuation that impairs rational judgement and confers an inability to see the dangers 
presented by the toxic substance, that is, the West (Esposito, 2003, 337).  
	
Chart 1.1 Polity IV Authority Trends in Iran. Taken from the Polity 
IV report in 2010 on Iran, by the Center for Systemic Peace.  
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This hatred of the West came to characterize much of Iranian-American interactions in the 
decades that followed.  
 After being reinstalled by the CIA, the shah initiated a series of reforms in 1963, the 
White Revolution, a secularization of Iran culture (O'Neil, Fields & Share, 2018, 519). The 
benefits of the White Revolution “went largely to elites in urban environments… The presence 
of Western corporations and banks fueled concerns about Western economic imperialism… 
Critical religious leaders and intellectuals were harassed, tortured, exiled, arrested, and 
sometimes killed” (Esposito, 2003, 337). Ayatollah Khomeini viewed the White Revolution as 
American reforms, further evidence of Western corruption and influence (Secor, 2016, 28). The 
Western rejection of oil nationalization, and the increase in coercive capacity to crack down on 
dissidents laid the groundwork for the Islamic Revolution3, where the shah would be overthrown 
and replaced with Ayatollah Khomeini.  
Resource rights and resource security  
 For much of Iran’s history, the possession of the resource rights to oil, and capital 
acquisition, have been closely tied. In Tilly’s model, capital and coercion are a closed loop; the 
acquisition of one is inextricably tied to the other. Coercion costs money, and money creates 
coercive bodies. The Mossadeq period and the subsequent CIA coup show that capital was less 
																																																								
3 The Islamic Revolution occurred in 1979 and ousted the shah from power and forced him into exile. Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Khomeini replaced him as the leader of the country, and the Islamic Republic of Iran was created. 
For further reading:  
Iran Chamber Society. The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Khomeini, R. (2010). Islamic government. Kentucky]: SIME. 
O'Neil, P., Fields, Karl J., & Share, Donald. (2018). Cases in comparative politics (Sixth ed.).  
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 521-532.  
Abrahamian, E. (2008). A history of modern Iran. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge  
University Press, p. 155-182. 
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important in this period; the British, in response to the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian oil 
company,  
were willing to increase royalties, share management with other Western companies, and 
even accept the principle of nationalization as long as it was not put into effect… The 
British ambassador admitted that London was willing to go beyond the normal 50/50 deal 
and give Iran as much as 60 percent of the profits so long as real ‘control’ remained in 
Western hands (Abrahamian, 2008, 119).  
 
Capital was clearly not top priority. Rather, coercion was more important – the CIA’s coercive 
abilities to undermine the Iranian government were stronger than the Iranian government’s 
ability to maintain control of its citizens, and eventually, its oil supply. The Iranian cry for 
resource rights was not able to outlast the Western demand for resource security. The balance 
between capital and coercion was no longer paramount to regime stability. Rather, relative 
coercive capacities were the key factor in undermining the Iranian government; relative to the 
CIA, the Iranian government’s coercive capacities were insufficient.  
2006-2015 
Sanctions and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
 Iran’s nuclear program became an international security concern in 20064, and various 
governing bodies imposed sanctions. Two intergovernmental organizations that imposed 
sanctions were the European Union5 (EU) and the United Nations Security Council6 (UNSC).  
																																																								
4 There is an important difference between nuclear energy programs and nuclear weapons programs. Nuclear energy 
programs require enrichment of uranium-235 isotopes to about twenty percent. Nuclear weapons programs require 
enrichment of uranium-235 isotopes to about ninety percent. Enriching uranium-235 isotopes enough to make a 
weapon requires a significant increase in technology (O'Neil, Fields & Share, 2018, 551-52: Esfandiary & Finaud, 
2016). However, much of the anxiety about nuclear weapons programs is due to the same type of uranium being 
needed for both. This makes monitoring agencies like the International Atomic Energy Agency essential for 
ensuring JCPOA compliance. The JCPOA agreement limits the percentage of uranium enrichment, and requires 
limits on technology and equipment that would lead to weapons-grade uranium (Esfandiary & Finaud, 2016).  5	European Union members are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (membership pending) 
(European Union. Countries).  
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The United States imposed additional sanctions, acting as an independent entity.   
 Sanctions predominately took two forms: nuclear and petroleum. Sanctions were directed 
towards crippling Iran’s nuclear program, or towards petroleum imports and exports in an 
attempt to cripple revenue streams. Sanctions on Iran’s petroleum were possible because of 
Iran’s involvement in the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) beginning in 
1960 (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Brief History). Over the next two 
decades, OPEC countries worked together to control production to influence oil prices; 
eventually, OPEC was able to increase international oil prices by four hundred percent in 1973, 
triggering an oil crisis (Black, Hashimzade, & Myles, 2017, 370-371). During this time, many of 
OPEC members were able to take “control of their domestic petroleum industries” (Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Brief History). After Iran had taken control of domestic 
oil, direct sanctions on Iran were possible, without sanctioning any outside, Western parties like 
bp. 
The UNSC imposed targeted sanctions on Iran for their nuclear program in 2006. These 
sanctions continued in various resolutions until the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA) was implemented in October 2015. The various means of sanctioning Iran are outlined 
in Table 1.1.  
																																																																																																																																																																																		6	There are five permanent members of the Security Council: China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US (United 
Nations Security Council. Current Members). There are ten rotating members, and in 2015 the rotating members 
were Venezuela (2015-16), Spain (2015-16), Nigeria (2014-15), New Zealand (2015-16), Malaysia (2015-16), 
Lithuania (2014-15), Jordan (2014-15), Chile (2014-15), Chad (2014-15), and Angola (2015-16) (United Nations 
Security Council. Countries Elected Members of the Security Council).  
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 UNSC sanctions are restricted primarily to nuclear proliferation activities and support 
networks for proliferation like technology and investment. The UNSC sanctions are an important 
part of keeping the focus on nuclear proliferation. Sanctions imposed by other entities branch out 
beyond nuclear proliferation, but the UNSC sanctions are a vital part of the collective siege that 
led Iran to the negotiating table in 2015. The impact of UNSC sanctions had a significant impact 
on the Iranian economy; “one former Iranian official admitted in late 2008 that the UN sanctions 
had increased the price of imports anywhere from ten to thirty percent” (Drezner, 2011, 103-
104). The UNSC enforcement of sanctions increased the coercive pressure on Iran, and overlaps 
with asset and entity freezes imposed by other entities.  
Episode 1 Resolution  
UNSCR 1737 
December 23, 2006 – 
March 24, 2007  
Nuclear proliferation-related technology 
and goods imports and exports ban; asset 
freeze on supporting entities and 
individuals.  
Episode 2 Resolution 
UNSCR 1747  
March 24, 2007 - March 
3, 2008 
Nuclear proliferation-related technology 
and goods imports and exports ban; asset 
freeze on supporting entities. 
Added embargo on arms exports.  
Episode 3 Resolution 
UNSCR 1803 
March 3, 2008 – June 9, 
2010  
Nuclear proliferation-related technology 
and goods imports and exports ban; asset 
freeze on supporting entities; embargo on 
arms exports. 
Added travel ban.  
Episode 4 Resolution 
UNSCR 1929 
June 9, 2010 – June 14, 
2013 
Nuclear proliferation-related technology 
and goods imports and exports ban; asset 
freeze on supporting entities; embargo on 
arms exports; travel ban. 
Added embargo on specific arms imports, 
nuclear proliferation investment ban, and 
as-needed bunkering ban. 
Episode 5 Resolutions  
UNSCR 2159  
UNSCR 2224 
UNSCR 2231  
 
June 14, 2013 – present*  Nuclear proliferation-related technology 
and goods imports and exports ban; asset 
freeze on supporting entities; embargo on 
arms exports; travel ban; embargo on 
specific arms imports, nuclear proliferation 
investment ban, and as-needed bunkering 
ban. 
 
Table 1.2 United Nations Security Council sanctions against Iran. UNSCR 2231 endorses the JCPOA, 
and previous resolutions sanctioning Iran will be terminated based on JCPOA compliance and at 
conclusion of the Security Council consideration of Iranian nuclear proliferation. 
Data taken from the Global Governance Centre’s SanctionsApp. 	
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 In addition to UNSC sanctions, the US imposed sanctions as well. The Comprehensive 
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law No: 111-195) was 
adopted into law on July 1, 2010. This act expanded upon the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 
regarding petroleum sanctions, in Section 102. In addition, sections 103, 104, and 105 specify 
the imposition of an import an export ban, an asset freeze, and a travel ban against select entities 
related to proliferation, respectively. 
The EU sanctions imposed by Iran included petroleum sanctions. Petroleum sanctions are 
a significant piece of an effective Iranian sanctions regime. “In order to exert maximum pressure 
on targets, the international community needs to identify the means by which targets maintain 
their ability to pose a threat to international peace and security” (Biersteker et. al., 2005, 62). 
When Iran is the country under consideration, oil must be considered, as it is a key capital-
producing resource in their economy. As oil is a key source of capital, it enables the funding of 
the Iranian nuclear program; the EU sanctions were effective because they targeted “Iran’s oil 
industry, prohibiting the insurance cover of oil 
shipping, freezing Iran’s Central Bank assets in 
the EU and cutting off Iranian banks from the 
global… payment network” (de Vries, Portela 
& Guijarro-Usobaiga, 2014, 5). The targeting 
of Iran’s oil industry included decreased or 
eliminated imports of Iranian oil from 2012 to 
2015 (European Commission Directorate-
General for Energy). This decrease can be seen 
in Table 1.2. These sanctions led to a 
Year  
Oil volume 
(1000 barrels)  
Total value 
($1000)  Import %  
2006 248,617 15,101,399 5.54 
2007 238,313 15,988,760 5.41 
2008 205,137 19,519,766 4.62 
2009 177,581 10,729,791 4.38 
2010 212,749 16,400,313 5.28 
2011 218,375 23,459,966 5.64 
2012 50,315 5,616,591 1.25 
2013 0 0 0 
2014 3,265 272,415 0.08 
2015 0 0 0 
2016 106,400 4,566,536 2.69 
2017 199,968 9,988,305 4.96 
Table 1.2 Data taken from the European 
Commission Directorate-General for Energy: 
Registration of Crude Oil Imports and Deliveries in 
the European Union, 2006-2017.  	
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significant decrease in Iranian oil production (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018).  
 It is important to note the difficulty with imposing petroleum sanctions at all. Escribá-
Folch and Wright show that “sanctions are less destabilizing in oil-producing countries, perhaps 
because demand for oil is highly inelastic in most sanction-sending countries, making them 
reluctant to disrupt energy supplies” (2010). The need for a unified party of sending countries 
becomes clear – because the need for oil is so inelastic, sanctioned countries will merely pivot to 
fill the needs of other countries. The Iran sanctions, and the resultant negotiations of the JCPOA, 
were successful largely because of the number of countries willing to boycott Iranian oil. In 
future sanctions, similar unity on behalf of sender countries will be needed in order to properly 
sanction Iran.  
When the UNSC, the US, and the EU sanctions were imposed, Iran’s capital decreased as 
the technology, suppliers, and export destinations were cut off. The combined effect of US, 
UNSC, and EU sanctions had an important effect on Iranian domestic politics; President Hassan 
Rouhani was elected in November 2013 on a platform of sanctions relief and improved relations 
with the West (Esfandiary & Finaud, 2016). Rouhani’s election was crucial, as it countered the 
anti-West sentiments of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei (Finaud, 2018). President 
Rouhani was able to communicate directly with President Obama and his administration about 
sanctions relief, which was an important step in negotiating the JCPOA (Finaud, 2018). In this 
way, sanctions were an important part of encouraging the dialogue needed to reach an 
agreement, and the eventual cessation of sanctions. To quote former Secretary of State Madeline 
Albright, “The purpose of foreign policy is to influence the policies and actions of other nations 
in a way that serves your interests and values. The tools available include everything from kind 
words to cruise missiles. Mixing them properly and with sufficient patience is the art of 
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diplomacy” (Albright & Woodward, 2003, 406). Sanctions, as a tool between words and war on 
the diplomatic spectrum, was a punitive measure that evolved into a desire for dialogue. Without 
such evolution, the JCPOA would have been much more difficult to negotiate (Finaud, 2018).  
The JCPOA itself is an agreement between Iran, the High Representative of the European 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the 
US, for the purpose of allowing Iran to develop a peaceful nuclear energy program within 
defined parameters, with the goal of lifting sanctions (UNSC Resolution 2231). The agreement 
includes a provision for the monitoring of the nuclear program by an independent international 
agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (UNSC Resolution 2231). The 
agreement affirms that Iran will not seek to develop nuclear weapons, that the involved countries 
will uphold the JCPOA in spirit and in practice, and marks a turning point in Iranian relations 
with the international community (UNSC Resolution 2231). The JCPOA marks the cessation of 
UNSC sanctions and EU sanctions against Iran; additionally, paragraph 20 of the JCPOA 
outlines the cessation of US sanctions against Iran, including petroleum sanctions and asset 
freezes (UNSC Resolution 2231). In paragraph 26, the agreement notes that “Iran has stated that 
it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the [US] sanctions… or such an imposition 
of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this 
JCPOA in whole or in part” (UNSC Resolution 2231). The JCPOA provides for monitoring and 
reassurance for the EU, China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the US, while also 
providing a safeguard for Iran in the case of member noncompliance. The JCPOA was a 
collective agreement, spawned by the collective sanctioning actions of multiple international 
groups and state actors. The international siege of Iran led to an opportunity for dialogue, which 
resulted in a comprehensive international agreement.  
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Natural resources secured, capital chokehold 
 In 1951, Mossadeq nationalized Iranian oil under the assumption that resource rights to 
oil would provide increased capital for the Iranian government and the Iranian people. The 
sanctions of the 2000s and 2010s show that this is not the case. The current international system 
mandates the need for exports to create revenue and create energy security; capital is no longer 
about what you possess, but also about whom you can sell to. In today’s international system, 
“what goes on inside states… often matters intensely to other members of the international 
system,” (Fukuyama, 2004, 92). This provides incentive for the outside states to apply coercion 
against the primary state, in order to limit the primary state’s capital. State building is no longer 
an isolated activity as it was for states in Europe; rather, the capital and coercion cost-benefit 
calculations of the international system and outside states are often just as important to state 
formation as internal capital-coercion balances. Tilly’s model of capital and coercion still 
applies, but the balance must be expanded to calculate for other states as well.  In the case of 
Iranian sanctions, the key balance was between EU, US, and UNSC coercion on one side, and 
Iranian capital on the other. A further breakdown could argue that the key balance was between 
EU, US, and UNSC capital on one side, and Iranian capital on the other; Tilly shows that 
coercion costs money, so the sanctioning actors had to have enough expendable capital to be able 
to afford coercive measures, and still have enough capital to maintain their own functioning.  
Such sanctions regimes, then, can only be truly effective in a globalized world with 
numerous trade deals. EU oil sanctions would not have been possible if Iran was the world’s 
only oil supplier; the EU had to have other trade deals with other countries, and access to enough 
oil to make Iran’s supply irrelevant, or the EU import reduction negligible, in order to still 
maintain energy security and sanction Iran at the same time.  
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 An important takeaway from the 2006-2015 period is the relative importance of Iranian 
capital versus the capital of the rest of the world, and Iranian capital versus the coercive 
capabilities of the rest of the world. The coercive capabilities needed to enforce sanctions acts as 
a balance against the capital of Iran. The capital-coercion balance of Tilly is no longer confined 
to the internal workings of the state.  
Discussion  
 Sanctions decrease a country’s capital as the technology, suppliers, or export destinations 
are cut off. The siege quality of sanctions restricts the options available in the target country’s 
cost-benefit analyses, and thereby punishes the target country while encouraging dialogue. 
Regardless of resource rights or available capital, sanctions are expensive politically or 
monetarily because they restrict options. The sanctioning state’s assumption is that such 
restriction will become too costly to bear, and the sanctioned state will capitulate. As such, the 
hypothesis that ‘sanctions imposition leads to a decrease in capital, as the technology, suppliers, 
or export destinations are cut off’ is supported.  
 In the case of Iran in 1953, the loss of oil revenues to bp shows that Tilly’s model of 
capital and coercion must be expended to include external forces, as external forces can be 
powerful factors in state formation. The CIA’s relative coercive capabilities were able to tip 
Iran’s coercion-capital balance in the favor of the US and the UK. 1953 indicated how important 
international interests would be in Iran’s continual state formation process; such a process is 
constantly ongoing. The need for Iran to consider outside interests in its domestic politics, and its 
internal capital-coercion cost-benefit calculations, would have important ramifications for the 
sanctions imposed several decades later.  
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The 2006-2015 sanctions regimes, imposed by the US, EU, and UNSC reinforced the 
multiple dimensions of Tilly’s theory. No longer are capital-coercion calculations limited to the 
state. Rather, such calculations can be conducted state to state, state to international organization, 
international organization to international organization, (or in the case of Iran, state to state to 
international organization to international organization) and all have crucial ramifications for 
internal state formation.  
 The forcible change of Iran’s government increased the Iranian government’s coercive 
capabilities, in the form of CIA interference and the White Revolution. Tilly’s theory postulates 
that an increase in capital will be tied to an increase in coercion (Tilly 1990). Sanctions literature 
shows that a decrease in capital often leads to an increase in coercion, as human rights decrease 
(Allen 2008; Gordon, 2015; Neier, 2015; Pavel & Pattison, 2015; Cameron, 2005; Drezner, 
2011). Together, Tilly and sanctions literature show that as capital decreases, coercion increases 
to maintain control over the preexisting population; additionally, as capital increases, coercion 
increases in response to maintain control over the rising capital. In both cases, capital is the 
variable that moves first, and coercion responds. However, in 1953 in Iran, coercion increased as 
the CIA reinstalled the shah, and after coercion increased then capital decreased as oil revenues 
were moved back to the West. And in the sanctions regimes of 2006-2015, coercion in the form 
of sanctions were imposed, and Iranian capital decreased. In Iran’s history, the coercive 
capabilities of the Iranian government have been increased as imperialist countries have claimed 
oil rights or as sanctions against Iranian oil have been imposed. As such, the Iran-specific 
hypothesis is not supported; the Iran case study reverses the sequence of more (or less) capital 
leading to more (or less) coercion, to more coercion creating less capital.  
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Conclusion 
 Sanctions are marked by an increase in coercion and a subsequent decrease in capital. As 
such, Charles Tilly’s capital and coercion state formation theory provides a valuable framework 
for analyzing the impact of sanctions. Tilly’s theory of state formation claims that states increase 
coercive capacities in response to an increase in capital. The 1953 CIA coup shows that capital 
decreases after external coercion is implemented. The 2006-2015 sanctions regimes against Iran 
show that sanctions decrease a country’s capital as the improvement and/or export opportunities 
are cut off. Taken together, both of these episodes in Iran’s history show that capital and 
coercion are still intertwined and crucial for a country’s state formation. However, Tilly’s model 
must be expanded to include the capital and coercion influences of external actors, and is no 
longer confined to the formation of a solitary state.  
 
  
Targeted	Sanctions,	Case	Study:	Iran		 	 Nygard			 26	
References 
Abrahamian, E. (2008). A history of modern Iran. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge  
University Press. 
Albright, M., & Woodward, William. (2003). Madam Secretary. New York, N.Y.: Miramax  
Books. 
Allen, S. H. (2008). The Domestic Political Cost of Economic Sanctions. The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 52 (6), 916-944. 
Biersteker, T. J., Eckert, S. E., Halegua, A., & Romaniuk, P. (2005). Targeted Sanctions and  
State Capacity: Towards a framework for national level implementation. In P. 
Wallensteen & C. Staibano (Eds.),  International sanctions : Between words and wars in 
the global system (Cass series on peacekeeping ; 21). London ; New York: Frank Cass. 
Black, J., Hashimzade, N., & Myles, G. (2017). Oxford Dictionary of Economics (5th ed.).  
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
BP. Post war - 1946-1970. Retrieved from  
https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/who-we-are/our-history/post-war.html  
Brown, G. W., McLean, I., & McMillan, A. (eds.)  (2018). The Concise Oxford Dictionary of  
Politics and International Relations (4th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cameron, I. (2005). Protecting Legal Rights: On the (in)security of targeted sanctions.  In P.  
Wallensteen & C. Staibano (Eds.),  International sanctions : Between words and wars in  
the global system (Cass series on peacekeeping ; 21). London ; New York: Frank Cass. 
Center for Systemic Peace (2010). Polity IV Country Report 2010: Iran. Retrieved from  
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Iran2010.pdf. 
de Vries, A. W., Portela, C. & Guijarro-Usobaiga, B. (2014) Improving Effectiveness for 
Sanctions: A Checklist for the EU. Centre for European Policy Studies: Special Report 
95. 
Drezner, D. W. (2011). Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice. 
International Studies Review, 13, 96-108. 
Elliot, K. A. (2005). Trends in Economic Sanctions Policy: Challenges to Conventional Wisdom.  
In P. Wallensteen & C. Staibano (Eds.),  International sanctions : Between words and  
wars in the global system (Cass series on peacekeeping ; 21). London ; New York: Frank  
Cass. 
Escribá-Folch, A., & Wright, J. (2010). Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the 
Survival of Authoritarian Rulers. International Studies Quarterly, 54 (2), 335-359. 
Esfandiary, D., & Finaud, M. (2016). The Iran Nuclear Deal: Distrust and Verify, An analysis of  
the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and its potential implications for  
global and regional security. Geneva Papers. Geneva Center for Security Policy. 
Esposito, J. (2003). The Oxford dictionary of Islam (Oxford reference online premium). New  
York: Oxford University Press. 
European Commission Directorate-General for Energy. Registration of Crude Oil Imports and  
Deliveries in the European Union. Retrieved from  
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/data-analysis/eu-crude-oil-imports 
European Union. Countries. Retrieved from  
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en#map 
Finaud, M.  (2018). Multilateral Diplomacy and the Iranian Nuclear Negotiations  [PowerPoint 
slides]. 
Fukuyama, F. (2004). State-building : Governance and world order in the 21st century. Ithaca,  
Targeted	Sanctions,	Case	Study:	Iran		 	 Nygard			 27	
N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
 
Fukuyama, F. (2011). The origins of political order : From prehuman times to the French  
Revolution (1st ed.). New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. (APA) 
Gasiorowski, M. J. (2000). The CIA Looks Back at the 1953 Coup in Iran. Middle East Report,  
216, 4-5. 
Gordon, J. (2015). The Invisibility of Human Harm: How Smart Sanctions Consumed All the 
Oxygen in the Room. Social Research, 82 (4), 863-874. 
Global Governance Centre (2015). SanctionsApp (Version 3.0). [Mobile phone application]  
Available from http://graduateinstitute.ch/home/research/centresandprogrammes/global-
governance/research-projects/UN_Targeted_Sanctions/sanctionsapp.html 
Iran Chamber Society. The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Kliman, D. M. (2015). Fateful Transitions: How Democracies Manage Rising Powers, from the  
Eve of World War I to China’s Ascendance. Philadelphia, P.A.: University of  
Pennsylvania Press. 
Khomeini, R., & Carpozi, George. (1979). Islamic government. New York: Manor Books. 
Khomeini, R. (2010). Islamic government. Kentucky]: SIME. 
Koch, S. (2015) A Typology of Political Conditionality Beyond Aid: Conceptual Horizons Based 
on Lessons from the European Union. World Development, 75, 97-108.  
Levitt, M. (2013). Hezbollah as a Criminal Organization. The Washington Institute. Retrieved  
from https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hezbollah-as-a-criminal- 
organisation.  
Molenaers, N., Gagiano, A., Smets, L. & Dellepiane, S. (2014). What Determines the Suspension 
of Budget Support? World Development, 75, 62-73. 
Neier, A. (2015). Sanctions and Human Rights. Social Research, 82 (4), 875-866.  
O'Neil, P., Fields, Karl J., & Share, Donald. (2018). Cases in comparative politics (Sixth ed.).  
New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Brief History. Retrieved from  
https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm 
Pavel, C., & Pattison, J. (2015). The Morality of Sanctions. 32(1), 192-215. 
Peksen, D. (2010). Coercive Diplomacy and Press Freedom: An Empirical Assessment of the 
Impact of Economic Sanctions on Media Openness. International Political Science 
Review, 31 (3), 449-469. 
Portela, C. (2016). Are European Union sanctions “targeted”? Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs. 29 (3), 912-929. 
Secor, L. (2016). Children of paradise: The struggle for the soul of Iran. New York: Riverhead  
Books. 
Takeyh, R. (2014, June 16). What Really Happened in Iran: The CIA, the Ouster of Mosaddeq,  
and the Restoration of the Shah. Council on Foreign Relations.   
Talbot, D. (2015). The devil's chessboard : Allen Dulles, the CIA, and the rise of America's  
secret government. New York, NY: Harper, an imprint of HarperCollins. 
Tilly, C. (1990). Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990-1990 (Studies in social  
discontinuity). Cambridge, Mass., USA: B. Blackwell. 
United Nations Security Council. Current Members. Retrieved from  
http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/ 
United Nations Security Council. Countries Elected Members of the Security Council. Retrieved  
Targeted	Sanctions,	Case	Study:	Iran		 	 Nygard			 28	
from http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/elected.asp 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. 
 
U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2018, April 9). Iran Analysis. Retrieved from  
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=IRN  
Wallensteen, P. (2005). Positive Sanctions: On the potential of rewards and target differentiation.  
In P. Wallensteen & C. Staibano (Eds.),  International sanctions: Between words and 
wars in the global system (Cass series on peacekeeping ; 21). London ; New York: Frank 
Cass. 
 
 
  
